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WEAK ARITHMETICAL INTERPRETATIONS
FOR THE LOGIC OF PROOFS
ROMAN KUZNETS AND THOMAS STUDER
Abstract. Artemov established an arithmetical interpretation for the Logics
of Proofs LPCS, which yields a classical provability semantics for the modal
logic S4. The Logics of Proofs are parameterized by so-called constant specifi-
cations CS, stating which axioms can be used in the reasoning process, and the
arithmetical interpretation relies on constant specifications being finite. In this
paper, we remove this restriction by introducing weak arithmetical interpreta-
tions that are sound and complete for a wide class of constant specifications,
including infinite ones. In particular, they interpret the full Logic of Proofs LP.
1. Introduction
The original motivation for developing the first justification logic, the Logic
of Proofs, was to provide intuitionistic logic with an adequate provability seman-
tics, i.e., a semantics that respects Brouwer’s fundamental idea, see, e.g., [TvD88a,
TvD88b], that
(1) intuitionistic truth means provability.
Heyting and Kolmogorov [Hey31, Hey34, Kol32] gave an explicit (but informal) def-
inition of this notion of intuitionistic truth, which nowadays is known as Brouwer–
Heyting–Kolmogorov (BHK) semantics for intuitionistic logic.
The BHK semantics is widely accepted as the intended semantics for intuition-
istic logic. However, it is purely informal and does not provide a precise definition
of intuitionistic truth. This was tackled by Go¨del [Go¨d33] who introduced a modal
calculus of classical provability (equivalent to S4) with the intended reading of F
as F is provable. Go¨del defined a translation t(·) from IL to S4 where the transla-
tion t(F ) of an intuitionistic formula F is given by
prefix each subformula of F with a -modality.
He apparently considered this to be an appropriate formalization of Brouwer’s the-
sis (1). Go¨del established that
IL ` F implies S4 ` t(F ) .
He conjectured that the converse direction also holds, which was later shown by
McKinsey and Tarski [MT48].
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However, the ultimate goal of providing a classical provability semantics for IL
is not achieved by Go¨del’s translation because no precise semantics is given for the
provability operator . The situation can be depicted as follows:
IL ↪→ S4→ . . . ??? . . .→ classical proofs .
Artemov [Art95, Art01] was able to give a formal provability semantics for S4.
He introduced the Logics of Proofs LPCS, which are systems in the spirit of S4 but
with explicit proof terms.
Artemov established a realization theorem, which provides an embedding r(·)
of S4 into LPCS (we describe formal conditions imposed on r(·) in Definition 6.3).
Further, he developed a formal provability semantics for LPCS, which gives us the
following chain of faithful embeddings:
IL ↪→ S4→ LPCS  classical proofs .
Hence, the Logics of Proofs LPCS can be viewed as a formalization of the BHK se-
mantics for intuitionistic propositional logic.
It is important that LPCS is not one single logic but rather a family of logics
parameterized by a so-called constant specification CS. Roughly speaking, the
purpose of this constant specification is to state which axioms are available for
the internalized reasoning process. Note that there exists the largest constant
specification and LP denotes its corresponding Logic of Proofs.
Artemov’s arithmetical semantics only works for finite CS, which, in a sense, is
enough since each proof can only refer to finitely many axioms. In other words, for
each formula F of the Logic of Proofs, there exists a finite constant specification CS
such that
LP ` F =⇒ LPCS ` F .
Since different proofs may require different finite constant specifications, we actually
have the following statement about arithmetic validity (where L and LJ are the
languages of modal logic and the Logic of Proofs respectively):
Theorem 1.1 ([Art95, Art01]). There exists a realization r : L → LJ such that
for each L-formula F
S4 ` F ⇐⇒ r(F ) is arithmetically CS-valid
for some finite constant specification CS.
In other words, the constant specification and, hence, the notion of validity
depend on the formula F . This is depicted in Figure 1, where two different formu-
las F and G lead to two arithmetical embeddings ∗CSF and ∗CSG that are based on
different constant specifications.1
It is the aim of this paper to establish an arithmetical interpretation result where
CS does not depend on the formula. Namely, we will show the following:
Theorem 1.2. Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specification. There exists a realization r such that for each
L-formula F
S4 ` F ⇐⇒ r(F ) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.
1Strictly speaking, it is always possible to use the same constant specification and, hence, the
same arithmetical embedding for any pair of formulas or, indeed, for any finite set of formulas.
However, infinitely many theorems of IL require the use of infinitely many arithmetical embeddings.
WEAK ARITHMETICAL INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE LOGIC OF PROOFS 3
LPCSF ` r(t(F ))
IL ` F
IL ` G
S4 ` t(F )
S4 ` t(G)
LP ` r(t(F ))
LP ` r(t(G)) PA
LPCSG ` r(t(G))
∗CSF
t r
∗CSG
Figure 1. Artemov’s arithmetical semantics
Since the total constant specification satisfies the requirements of this theorem,
we obtain an arithmetical semantics for the Logic of Proofs LP itself. Figure 2
illustrates our result.
IL ` F S4 ` t(F ) LP ` r(t(F )) PAt r ∗
Figure 2. Weak arithmetical semantics
Of course, there is a price to pay for removing the dependence on the constant
specification. Artemov’s arithmetical semantics interprets the operations on evi-
dence terms by computable functions on codes for proofs. It is open whether this
is also possible in our semantics, and, hence, we call it weak.
2. The Logic of Proofs
Justification terms are built from countably many (justification) constants ci and
countably many (justification) variables xi according to the following grammar:
t ::= ci | xi | (t · t) | (t+ t) | !t .
We denote the set of terms by Tm. Formulas are built from countably many atomic
propositions pi according to the following grammar:
F ::= pi | ⊥ | (F → F ) | t:F .
Prop denotes the set of atomic propositions and LJ denotes the set of (justification)
formulas. We define negation ¬, conjunction ∧, and disjunction ∨ as usual.
The axioms of LP consist of all instances of the following schemes:
all propositional tautologies
j t:(A→ B)→ (s:A→ t·s:B) Application
j+ s:A ∨ t:A→ s+t:A Sum
jt t:A→ A Reflection
j4 t:A→ !t:t:A Positive Introspection
A constant specification CS for LP is any subset
CS ⊆ {(c, A) | c is a constant and A is an axiom of LP}.
For a constant specification CS the deductive system LPCS is the Hilbert system
given by the axioms above and by the rules modus ponens and axiom necessitation:
A A→ B
B
(MP) ,
(c, A) ∈ CS
c:A
(AN) .
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Definition 2.1 (Axiomatic appropriateness, schematicness, almost schematicness).
A constant specification CS is called
(i) axiomatically appropriate if, for each axiom A of LP, there is a constant c
such that (c, A) ∈ CS;
(ii) schematic if it satisfies the following property: for each constant c, the
set of axioms {A | (c, A) ∈ CS} consists of all instances of one or several
(possibly zero) axiom schemes of LP;
(iii) almost schematic if it is the union of a schematic and a finite constant
specifications.
In this paper, justification terms represent formal mathematical proofs. There
are, however, many more forms of justifications that can be considered in a general
epistemic setting, such as direct observation, public announcements, or private
communication. Systems of explicit justifications, together with a corresponding
possible world semantics, make it possible to analyze (dynamic) epistemic situations
in a fine-grained way and to formalize and discuss many epistemic problems and
puzzles [Art08, Art12, BKR+10, BKS11, BRS14, DK14, KS12, KS13, Ren11].
3. Decidability for LPCS
Generated models are models for LPCS where the evidence relation is generated
by the least fixed point construction. To inductively construct this least fixed point,
we need a monotone operator, which is given as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Evidence closure). Let B ⊆ Tm×LJ. For a set X ⊆ Tm×LJ we
define clB(X) ⊆ Tm× LJ as follows:
(i) if (t, A) ∈ B, then (t, A) ∈ clB(X);
(ii) if (s,A) ∈ X or (t, A) ∈ X, then (s+ t, A) ∈ clB(X);
(iii) if (s,A) ∈ X and (t, A→ B) ∈ X, then (t · s,B) ∈ clB(X);
(iv) if (t, A) ∈ X, then (!t, t:A) ∈ clB(X).
Note that clB is a monotone operator on Tm × LJ. Hence, it has the least fixed
point E(B), which we call the minimal evidence relation over B.
Definition 3.2 (Generated Model). A generated model is a pair M = (val,B)
where val ⊆ Prop and B ⊆ Tm×LJ. For a constant specification CS, the generated
model M is called a generated CS-model if CS ⊆ B.
Definition 3.3 (Truth in generated models). Let M = (val,B) be a generated
model and D be a formula. We define the relation M  D as follows:
(i) M 6 ⊥;
(ii) M  pi iff pi ∈ val;
(iii) M  A→ B iff M 1 A or M  B;
(iv) M  t:A iff (t, A) ∈ E(B) and M  A.
Definition 3.4 (Finitary model). Let CS be an almost schematic constant spec-
ification. Let C ⊆ Tm × LJ be finite and set B := CS ∪ C. Further let val be a
finite valuation, i.e., a finite subset of Prop. Then we call the generated CS-model
M = (val,B) a finitary CS-model.
A formula D is valid with respect to finitary CS-models ifM  D for all finitary
CS-models M.
We have soundness and completeness of LPCS with respect to finitary CS-models:
WEAK ARITHMETICAL INTERPRETATIONS FOR THE LOGIC OF PROOFS 5
Theorem 3.5 ([Kuz08, BKS13]). Let CS be an almost schematic constant speci-
fication. For each formula F ∈ LJ,
LPCS ` F iff F is valid with respect to finitary CS-models.
Remark 3.6. CS is restricted to be almost schematic only because this restriction
is present in the definition of finitary models, which are the key to establishing
decidability for the Logics of Proofs. Soundness holds for arbitrary CS for an
extended class of models.
Theorem 3.7. Let CS be a primitive recursive and almost schematic constant
specification. For each finitary CS-model, its satisfaction relation is primitive re-
cursive.
Proof. By a careful examination of the decision algorithm for the satisfaction rela-
tion from [Kuz08, Corollary 4.4.8]. 
4. Peano Arithmetic
In this section, we introduce all notions and concepts of Peano Arithmetic PA
that will be needed later in order to present arithmetical interpretations for the
Logics of Proofs. We employ a formulation of PA that includes symbols for all
primitive recursive functions and relations.
The language LPA of arithmetic is the language of first-order logic with countably
many (individual) variables, with the logical symbols ⊥, →, and ∀, and with the
following non-logical symbols:
(i) an n-ary function symbol f for each n-ary primitive recursive function f ;
(ii) an n-ary relation symbol R for each n-ary primitive recursive relation R.
We use x, y, z, . . . to denote individual variables of LPA and hope the reader is
able to distinguish them from the justification variables of LJ. Further, we denote
formulas of LPA by φ, ψ, . . .. A sentence is a formula without free occurrences of
variables.
For each natural number n, we use its standard representation s(s(. . . s︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
(0) . . .))
in the language LPA, call it a numeral, and denote it by n. When working in LPA,
we will often use f for f , R for R, and n for n whenever the exact typification can
be inferred from the context. In particular, we often write = for =.
Peano Arithmetic PA is given in the language LPA. It comprises the axioms
and rules of first-order predicate logic, equality axioms for the primitive recursive
relation =, defining axioms for all primitive recursive functions and relations, the
standard arithmetical axioms for the successor function, and the induction axioms.
As usual, we write PA ` φ if the formula φ is provable in PA.
If φ is a sentence, we write N  φ to say that φ is true in the standard model N
of the natural numbers. In the following, we assume that PA is sound with respect
to N: for all LPA-sentences φ,
(2) PA ` φ implies N  φ .
Remark 4.1. This assumption is standard (and, indeed, mundane) for both the
Logic of Proofs and Provability Logic to the point of not being formulated as a
stand-alone lemma but being used implicitly or mentioned in passing in an intro-
duction, cf., for instance, statements
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• “It is obvious that provably valid yields valid” ([Art01, p. 13]);
• “[A]ll sentences provable in Peano Arithmetic are indeed true about the
natural numbers [...]” ([Ver14, Sect. 1]).
Definition 4.2 (Provable equivalence). LPA-formulas φ and ψ are called provably
equivalent if
PA ` φ↔ ψ .
Now we can define several important classes of LPA-formulas.
Definition 4.3 (Primitive recursive, Σ1-, and ∆1-formulas).
(i) A standard primitive recursive formula is an LPA-formula of the form
R(t0, . . . , tn−1)
where R is an n-ary primitive recursive relation.
(ii) A standard Σ1-formula is an LPA-formula of the form
∃xφ
where φ is a standard primitive recursive formula.
(iii) An LPA-formula φ is provably Σ1 if there exists a standard Σ1-formula ψ
such that φ and ψ are provably equivalent.
(iv) An LPA-formula φ is provably ∆1 if both φ and ¬φ are provably Σ1.
Lemma 4.4 ([Boo93]). The class of provably ∆1 formulas is closed under Boolean
connectives and under substitutions of terms for variables. All standard primitive
recursive formulas are provably ∆1.
It is a key fact that PA is complete for provably Σ1 sentences.
Lemma 4.5 ([Boo93]).
(i) Let φ be a provably Σ1 sentence. If N  φ, then PA ` φ.
(ii) Let φ be a sentence such that ¬φ is provably Σ1. If N 2 φ, then PA ` ¬φ.
Formulating this lemma for provably ∆1 sentences yields the following corollary,
which we are going to apply often.
Theorem 4.6. Let φ be a provably ∆1 sentence.
(i) If N  φ, then PA ` φ.
(ii) If N 2 φ, then PA ` ¬φ.
To be able to talk within PA about formulas and proofs of PA, as well as about
formulas and terms of LP, we need a so-called Go¨del numbering of LPA∪LJ, i.e., an
assignment of a numerical code pφq ∈ N to each formula φ ∈ LPA ∪ LJ and of a
numerical code ptq ∈ N to each term t ∈ LPA ∪ LJ . As mentioned above, when
working in LPA, we often use m for m. Accordingly, whenever pφq occurs within
an LPA-formula, what we mean is, of course, the LPA-term pφq.
Making use of the Go¨del numbering, we can state the Diagonalization lemma,
which is crucial for defining arithmetical interpretations for LPCS.
Lemma 4.7 (Diagonalization). Let ψ(y, x0, . . . , xn−1) be an LPA-formula. There
exists an LPA-formula φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) such that
• PA ` φ(x0, . . . , xn−1)↔ ψ
(
pφ(x0, . . . , xn−1)q, x0, . . . , xn−1
)
;
• φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) is provably ∆1 if ψ(y, x0, . . . , xn−1) is; and
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• φ(x0, . . . , xn−1) contains a relation symbol R if ψ(y, x0, . . . , xn−1) does.
Proof. The first two conditions form the classical formulation of the diagonaliza-
tion lemma (see, e.g., [Boo93]). The third condition easily follows from a close
observation of the proof in [Boo93]. 
Last but not least we will use the notion of a proof predicate:
Definition 4.8 (Proof predicate). A proof predicate is a provably ∆1 formula Prf(x, y)
with no free occurrences of variables other than x and y such that for every LPA-
sentence φ we have
(3) PA ` φ ⇐⇒ N  Prf(n, pφq) for some natural number n.
We will not formally establish the existence of proof predicates for PA. A detailed
formal construction of a proof predicate is presented, e.g., in [Gir87]. For the rest of
this paper, we simply assume that we are given the usual primitive recursive proof
predicate Proof(x, y) for Peano Arithmetic.
5. Weak Arithmetical Interpretation
Definition 5.1 (Weak arithmetical interpretation). A weak arithmetical interpre-
tation is a pair (∗,Prf) such that
(i) ∗ maps atomic propositions of LJ to sentences of LPA;
(ii) ∗ maps evidence terms of LJ to numerals of LPA;
(iii) Prf is a proof predicate; and
(iv) for all evidence terms s and t,
N  Prf
(
s∗, pφ→ ψq
)
∧ Prf
(
t∗, pφq
)
→ Prf
(
(s · t)∗, pψq
)
,(4)
N  Prf
(
s∗, pφq
)
∨ Prf
(
t∗, pφq
)
→ Prf
(
(s+ t)∗, pφq
)
, and(5)
N  Prf
(
s∗, pφq
)
→ Prf
(
(!s)∗, pPrf
(
s∗, pφq
)q) .(6)
We extend the mapping ∗ to all formulas of LJ by setting
(t:F )∗ := Prf(t∗, pF ∗q) , ⊥∗ := ⊥ , and (F → G)∗ := F ∗ → G∗ .
If there is no need to explicitly mention the proof predicate Prf, we denote the weak
arithmetical interpretation (∗,Prf) by ∗.
Given a CS, a weak arithmetical interpretation ∗ is called a weak arithmetical CS-
interpretation if for each (c, A) ∈ CS we have N  (c:A)∗. An LJ-formula F is weakly
arithmetically CS-valid if PA ` F ∗ for all weak arithmetical CS-interpretations ∗.
Theorem 5.2 (Weak Arithmetical Soundness). Let CS be a constant specification
and F be an LJ-formula. Then
(7) LPCS ` F implies F is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.
Proof. Suppose ∗ is a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. We show (7) by induc-
tion on the LPCS-derivation of F . We use the fact that F
∗ is always a sentence.
If F is a classical tautology, then so is F ∗ and we trivially have PA ` F ∗.
If F is an instance of j, j+, or j4, then N  F ∗ follows from (4)–(6). Since
F is a Boolean combination of s:G-type formulas, F ∗ is a Boolean combination
of substitution instances of provably ∆1 formulas and is itself provably ∆1 by
Lemma 4.4. It follows by Theorem 4.6 that PA ` F ∗.
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If F is the conclusion of an instance of axiom necessitation, then F has the form
c:A where (c, A) ∈ CS. We have N  (c:A)∗ because ∗ is a CS-interpretation. Since
(c:A)∗ is a substitution instance of a provably ∆1 formula, by Lemma 4.4 it is
provably ∆1 itself, and PA ` (c:A)∗ by Theorem 4.6.
The only axiom instances F where we cannot be sure that F ∗ is provably ∆1 are
instances of jt. If F = t:A → A, then F ∗ = Prf(t∗, pA∗q) → A∗. We distinguish
two cases, depending on whether the sentence Prf(t∗, pA∗q) is true or false:
• N  Prf(t∗, pA∗q). By (3), we find PA ` A∗ and, thus,
PA ` Prf(t∗, pA∗q)→ A∗ .
• N 2 Prf(t∗, pA∗q). In this case, Prf(t∗, pA∗q) is a false provably ∆1 sentence,
meaning that PA ` ¬Prf(t∗, pA∗q) by Theorem 4.6. Therefore, again
PA ` Prf(t∗, pA∗q)→ A∗ .
Finally, if F is the conclusion of an instance of modus ponens, the claim follows
by the induction hypothesis and the fact that ∗ distributes through implication. 
In the remainder of this section we show completeness of LPCS with respect to any
weak arithmetical CS-interpretation where CS is a primitive recursive and almost
schematic constant specification. In order to obtain this result, we will establish
the following property:
Lemma 5.3. For each finitary CS-model Mfin, there exists a weak arithmetical
CS-interpretation ∗ such that for all LJ-formulas G
(8) Mfin  G implies N  G∗ .
Weak arithmetical completeness easily follows from Lemma 5.3.
Theorem 5.4 (Weak arithmetical completeness). Let CS be a primitive recursive
and almost schematic constant specification. For any formula F of LJ we have
F is weakly arithmetically CS-valid implies LPCS ` F .
Proof. Assume that LPCS 0 F . By Theorem 3.5, there exists a finitary CS-modelMfin
with Mfin 1 F . Thus, Mfin  ¬F . By Lemma 5.3, there is a weak arithmetical
CS-interpretation ∗ such that N  (¬F )∗, i.e., N  ¬(F ∗). Therefore, N 2 F ∗, which
implies PA 0 F ∗ by soundness (2) of PA. Hence, F is not weakly arithmetically
CS-valid. 
The complicated part is to establish (8). For the rest of this section, we assume
that we are given
(i) a primitive recursive and almost schematic constant specification CS and
(ii) a finitary CS-model Mfin.
Further, we assume that the Go¨del numbering of the union of LPA and LJ is
injective, i.e.,
pE1q = pE2q if and only if E1 ≡ E2
for arbitrary expressions E1 and E2.
We first have to decide what objects should serve as ‘proofs’ in our arithmetical
interpretation. There will be two sources of ‘proofs’:
(i) To begin with, all usual proofs will be ‘proofs.’ This guarantees that the
direction from left to right in (3) is satisfied.
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(ii) The second source of ‘proofs’ are the evidence terms of LJ. Every term t is
a ‘proof’ for all formulas B for which Mfin  t:B.
To take care of the usual proofs, we make use of the usual primitive recursive
proof predicate Proof(x, y) for Peano Arithmetic. Without loss of generality we
assume that N 2 Proof(psq, k) for any evidence term s of LJ and any natural
number k.
In order to deal with the evidence terms, we denote by Prf(x, y) a formula with
no free variables other than x and y that will be chosen later based on its desired
properties that we are going to discuss now. For any such Prf(x, y), we can define
an auxiliary translation † from LJ-formulas to LPA-sentences as follows:
p† :=
{
ppq = ppq if Mfin  p ,
¬(ppq = ppq) otherwise for any atomic proposition p;
(t:F )† := Prf(ptq, pF †q) ;
⊥† := ⊥ ;
(F → G)† := F † → G† .
Obviously, atomic propositions that hold inMfin are translated to true provably ∆1
sentences and atomic propositions that do not hold in Mfin are translated to false
provably ∆1 sentences. The former are provable and the latter are refutable in PA.
Remark 5.5. We need the translation † to be injective. Therefore, simply putting
p† :=
{
0 = 0 if Mfin  p ,
0 = 1 otherwise
would not be sufficient.
Lemma 5.6. If the formula Prf(x, y) contains some relation symbolR other than =,
i.e., some relation symbol not occurring in the †-translation outside of Prf, then this
translation is injective, in other words,
(9) F † ≡ G† implies F ≡ G .
Proof. We assume F † ≡ G† and show (9) by induction on the structure of the
LJ-formula F .
(i) F is an atomic proposition. By the definition of †, G must also be an atomic
proposition and, by the injectivity of the Go¨del numbering, G must be the
same atomic proposition as F .
(ii) F is ⊥. By the definition of †, it is clear that G ≡ ⊥.
(iii) F is a formula s:F1. Then G must be of the form t:G1. Indeed, by the defi-
nition of †, it is obvious that G can be neither ⊥ nor an atomic proposition.
Suppose towards a contradiction the only remaining possibility, i.e., that
G ≡ G1 → G2. Since (s:F1)† ≡ Prf(k, n) for suitable k and n, the sentence
(s:F1)
† ≡ G†1 → G†2 would contain the symbol R, meaning that G†1 or G†2
would contain a subformula of the form Prf(k1, n1). Let l be the number
of occurrences of → in Prf(x, y). Substitutions of terms for variables do
not affect Boolean connectives, hence both (s:F1)
† and Prf(k1, n1) would
contain exactly l occurrences of → each. But then G†1 → G†2 would contain
at least l+ 1 occurrences of →. This contradiction shows the impossibility
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of (s:F1)
† ≡ G†1 → G†2. Therefore, G ≡ t:G1. By the induction hypothesis
and injectivity of the Go¨del numbering we conclude s ≡ t and F1 ≡ G1.
(iv) F is F1 → F2. By the same argument as in (iii), we have G ≡ G1 → G2.
By the induction hypothesis, F1 ≡ G1 and F2 ≡ G2. 
For any formula Prf(x, y) that yields an injective †, it can be shown by using
the standard techniques for Go¨del numbering that binary functions dag(x, y) and
undag(x, y) such that
dag(pBq, pPrf(x, y)q) = pB†q and undag(pB†q, pPrf(x, y)q) = pBq
are primitive recursive and our language contains the corresponding function sym-
bols dag and undag (it does not matter much how these functions are defined on
inputs that are not Go¨del numbers of such formulas, e.g., they can be assumed
to be constant on all other inputs). Note that the functions dag and undag are
supposed to take the Go¨del number of Prf(x, y) as a parameter. Hence, unlike
the translation †, these functions do not depend on Prf(x, y). This means, in par-
ticular, that the way undag is defined does not depend on whether † is injective.
The above property, however, is only guaranteed for injective †’s. Note also that
dag and undag do depend on the chosen model Mfin.
By Theorem 3.7, the satisfaction relation forMfin is primitive recursive. There-
fore, there is a binary relation symbol Jus such that
N  Jus(n, k) ⇐⇒ there is a term s and a formula F such that
n = psq, and k = pFq, and Mfin  s:F .
As mentioned in Lemma 4.4, Jus(x, y) is a provably ∆1 formula. Using Lemma 4.7,
we now define the desired formula Prf(x, y) to satisfy
(10) PA ` Prf(x, y)↔ Proof(x, y) ∨ Jus
(
x, undag
(
y, pPrf(x, y)q
))
.
Moreover, since Proof(x, y)∨Jus(x, undag(y, z)) is clearly provably ∆1, so is our Prf(x, y)
by Lemma 4.7. It follows by Lemma 4.4 that F † is provably ∆1 for each F .
Thus, by soundness (2) of PA, for the universal closure of (10),
(11) N  ∀x∀y
(
Prf(x, y)↔ Proof(x, y) ∨ Jus
(
x, undag
(
y, pPrf(x, y)q
)))
.
Further, (9) holds by Lemma 4.7 because the formula Prf(x, y) contains the
relation symbol Jus. It follows that undag really performs the inverse translation,
i.e., informally we have
Prf(x, y) ⇐⇒
Proof(x, y)
or
there is a term s and a formula F such that
x = psq, and y = pF †q, and Mfin  s:F .
The key property of the translation † that is based on the chosen Prf is that LJ-
formulas that hold (do not hold) inMfin are translated to true (false) LPA-sentences,
as stated formally in the following lemma:
Lemma 5.7. For each formula F of LJ,
(i) Mfin  F implies N  F †;
(ii) Mfin 1 F implies N 2 F †.
Proof. By simultaneous induction on the structure of F . We distinguish the fol-
lowing cases:
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(i) Let F be an atomic proposition. IfMfin  F , then F † is pFq = pFq, which
clearly is true. If Mfin 1 F , then F † is ¬(pFq = pFq), which clearly is
false.
(ii) If F = ⊥, then trivially we have Mfin 1 ⊥ and N 2 ⊥.
(iii) The case of F = G→ H is immediate by the induction hypothesis.
(iv) Let F = s:G. If Mfin  s:G, then N  Jus(psq, pGq). Given that
(12) pGq = undag
(pG†q, pPrf(x, y)q) ,
we have by (11) that N  Prf
(
psq, pG†q
)
, i.e., N  (s:G)†.
If Mfin 1 s:G, then N 2 Jus(psq, pGq). Moreover, N 2 Proof
(
psq, pG†q
)
since by our assumptions N 2 Proof(psq, k) for any k. Thus, by (11) and (12),
we have N 2 Prf
(
psq, pG†q
)
, i.e., N 2 (s:G)†. 
Next, we show that Prf(x, y) is a proof predicate.
Lemma 5.8. For every LPA-sentence φ,
PA ` φ ⇐⇒ N  Prf(n, pφq) for some natural number n.
Proof. From left to right. Suppose PA ` φ. Then there is a natural number n such
that N  Proof(n, pφq). By (11), we conclude N  Prf(n, pφq).
From right to left. Suppose that N  Prf(n, pφq). Then, by (11), either N 
Proof(n, pφq), in which case PA ` φ follows immediately, or n = psq for some
evidence term s and some LJ-formula F such that pFq = undag
(
pφq, pPrf(x, y)q
)
andMfin  s:F . Therefore, φ ≡ F † andMfin  F . By the previous lemma, N  F †.
Since F † is a provably ∆1 sentence, we find PA ` F †, i.e., PA ` φ. 
Now we obtain a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation as follows.
Lemma 5.9. Let ∗ be a mapping such that s∗ := psq for each evidence term s and
p∗ := p† for each atomic proposition p. Then the pair (∗,Prf) is a weak arithmetical
CS-interpretation. Moreover,
(13) F ∗ = F †
for any LJ-formula F .
Proof. We start with showing (13) by induction on the structure of F . We distin-
guish the following cases.
(i) If F is an atomic proposition, then F ∗ = F † by definition.
(ii) If F = t:G, then t∗ = ptq. By the induction hypothesis, G∗ = G†. Thus,
(t:G)∗ = Prf(t∗, pG∗q) = Prf(ptq, pG†q) = (t:G)† .
(iii) If F = ⊥, then ⊥∗ = ⊥† by definition.
(iv) If F = G → H, then G∗ = G† and H∗ = H† by the induction hypothesis.
Thus, (G→ H)∗ = G∗ → H∗ = G† → H† = (G→ H)†.
This finishes the proof of (13).
We show that (∗,Prf) is indeed a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. The
mapping ∗ maps atomic propositions of LJ to sentences of LPA and evidence terms
to numerals. Further, Prf is a proof predicate by the previous lemma. It remains
to establish (4)–(6) from Definition 5.1. We only present a proof of (4). The other
proofs are similar.
Assume that N  Prf(s∗, pφ→ ψq) and N  Prf(t∗, pφq), i.e., in other words, N 
Prf(psq, pφ→ ψq) and N  Prf(ptq, pφq). By our assumptions, N 2 Proof(prq, k)
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for any evidence term r and any natural number k. Therefore, by (11), we find
φ ≡ F † and ψ ≡ G† for some LJ-formulas F and G such that
Mfin  s:(F → G) and Mfin  t:F .
Hence,Mfin  (s · t):G. Therefore, by (11), we obtain N  Prf(ps · tq, pG†q), which
is N  Prf
(
(s · t)∗, pψq).
It remains to show that the constant specification is respected. Let (c, A) ∈ CS.
Then Mfin  c:A. Thus, by Lemma 5.7, we have N  (c:A)†. Hence, by (13), we
have N  (c:A)∗. 
Now, Lemma 5.3 follows easily. First, observe that by Lemma 5.9 the pair (∗,Prf)
is a weak arithmetical CS-interpretation. Suppose Mfin  G. By Lemma 5.7, we
find N  G†, which is N  G∗ by (13). This completes the proof of weak arithmetical
completeness.
6. A Semantics of Proofs for Intuitionistic Logic
Definition 6.1 (Forgetful projection). The mapping ◦ : LJ → L is defined as
follows:
p◦ := p for p ∈ Prop ,
⊥◦ := ⊥ ,
(A→ B)◦ := A◦ → B◦ ,
(t:A)
◦ := A◦ .
Lemma 6.2 ([Art01]). For any constant specification CS and any formula F ∈ LJ,
LPCS ` F implies S4 ` F ◦ .
Definition 6.3 (Realization). A realization is a mapping r : L → LJ such that(
r(A)
)◦
= A.
The realization theorem provides an embedding of S4 into LPCS:
Theorem 6.4 (Realization, [Art01, Fit05, GK12]). Let CS be an axiomatically
appropriate and schematic constant specification. There exists a realization r such
that for each L-formula F
S4 ` F implies LPCS ` r(F ) .
Theorem 6.5. Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specification. There exists a realization r such that, for each
L-formula F ,
S4 ` F if and only if r(F ) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.
Proof. First we show the direction from left to right. By the realization theorem,
there exists a realization r such that for each L-formula F
S4 ` F implies LPCS ` r(F ) .
Combining this with Theorem 5.2, we obtain, for each L-formula F ,
S4 ` F implies r(F ) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.
For the direction from right to left, let r be an arbitrary realization and suppose
that r(F ) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid. By Theorem 5.4, we obtain LPCS `
r(F ). Hence, by Lemma 6.2, we find S4 ` F . 
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To obtain a provability semantics for intuitionistic logic IL, we combine the pre-
vious result with the Go¨del translation from IL to S4. By Lip we understand
the propositional language of intuitionistic logic IL. Note that it must include all
Boolean connectives ∧, ∨, and → because these are intuitionistically independent
of each other. Let the translation t(·) from IL to S4 be such that, for each formula F
of the language Lip of IL,
IL ` F if and only if S4 ` t(F ) .
Corollary 6.6. Let CS be a primitive recursive, axiomatically appropriate, and
schematic constant specification. There exists a realization r such that, for each
Lip-formula F ,
IL ` F if and only if r(t(F )) is weakly arithmetically CS-valid.
7. Related Work
The construction of the proof predicate Prf(x, y) presented here is essentially
taken from Artemov’s original proof of arithmetical completeness for LPCS, see [Art95,
Art01, AB05]. Goris [Gor08] used a similar construction to provide LPCS with a
semantics of proofs in Buss’s system S12.
Our result relies on the fact that LPCS is decidable not only for finite constant
specifications but, more generally, for almost schematic ones. The first general
decidability proof for LPCS with non-finite CS was done by Mkrtychev [Mkr97]. The
notion of an almost schematic constant specification goes back to Kuznets [Kuz08].
For recent presentations of various decidability results, see [BKS13, Stu12, Stu13].
Go¨del [Go¨d95] suggested using a system with explicit proofs for the interpretation
of S4 in a lecture already in 1938, but the transcript of the lecture only appeared
in 1995. Even before the publication of Go¨del’s work, Artemov [Art95] came up
with the Logic of Proofs LPCS and established the realization theorem, as well as
completeness with respect to arithmetical interpretations.
The first systems for logics of proofs featuring formulas of the form t:F with the
intended meaning t is a proof of F appear in the work of Artemov and Straßen [AS93a,
AS93b], who investigate arithmetical interpretations for these logics. However,
these ancestors of LPCS had no operations on proof terms and were too weak to
capture the -modality of S4 in full.
8. Conclusion
What is new in our work is the observation that, if one considers weak arithmeti-
cal interpretations, the construction of the proof predicate for them can be based
on the largest constant specification and, thereby, be suitable for all constant spec-
ifications. Our Corollary 6.6 provides a uniform arithmetical provability semantics
for intuitionistic logic, a semantics that can be based on any of a wide class of
constant specifications. This strengthens the previously known result by Artemov
that each intuitionistically valid formula has a constant specification that provides
a provability interpretation for this formula. In particular, for the first time, the
Logic of Proofs LP itself, i.e., LPCS with the total constant specification CS where
each constant proves every axiom, provides a provability semantics for intuitionistic
logic.
It might be useful to point out exactly how Artemov’s semantics was weakened
to obtain this result. The obvious change was that the finiteness of proofs property
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had to be dropped. According to Artemov’s definition of the proof predicate, each
‘proof’ can only prove finitely many formulas, whereas in our case the interpreta-
tion of a constant generally needs to prove infinitely many axioms from a given
axiom scheme(s). Secondly, while we define how to interpret arithmetically the ·,
+, and ! operations on proof terms, we do not extend the corresponding arithmeti-
cal functions to the (Go¨del numbers of) proofs obtained from the standard Go¨del
proof predicate Proof.
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